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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to examine technology’s impact on the labor market through the lens 
of skilled labor. Technical changes in the late 20th century are skill-biased in nature, because 
they are found to complement with skilled labor who are adept at adopting new technologies. 
However, recent studies document a lower demand for high-skilled labor in the 21st century, 
compared with the late 20th century. Are technologies starting to substitute for human skills 
instead of complementing them? Drawing on the wage share data from 1975 to 2015 for 18 
sectors in the United States, I find strong and robust evidence of complementary relationships 
between technical changes and demand for skilled labor. Furthermore, my results suggest that 
technologies have become more skilled-biased, not less, in the 21st century. 
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I. Introduction  
This paper aims to shed light on the the relationship between technological changes, 
capital and skill demand in the 21st century. It attempts to explore how recent technological 
changes affect the demand for skilled labor, and how that relationship varies over time and 
across industries. 
The concern over new technologies destroying jobs is not a new one. Numerous scholars 
have expressed concerns over the impact of recent technological changes on the labor market. In 
his 2014 book The Second Machine Age, Brynjolfsson argues that while the Industrial 
Revolution, or First Machine Age, is “all about power systems to augment human muscle”, in the 
Second Machine Age “we are beginning to automate a lot more cognitive tasks, a lot more of the 
control systems that determine what to use that power for.” According to Brynjolfsson, 
computerized machines nowadays are so smart and powerful that they will start substituting for 
skilled human labor rather than complementing it.  
Along these lines, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) study labor market data in 59 
countries from 1975 to 2012 and observe downward trends in the labor share for 42 of them. 
These findings lead to a widespread concern that the relationship between capital and skill is 
changing in the 21st century, as machines start replacing human labor at the top of the skill 
distribution. Do recent technological changes challenge the capital-skill complementarity 
assumption?  
There is also empirical evidence revealing a lower demand for skilled labor within the 
last decade. Economists frequently characterize information and communication technologies 
(ICT) in the 21st century as skill-biased in nature because they favor skilled workers who are 
suitable to adopt new technologies over unskilled ones. However, some recent studies find 
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evidence against the complementary relationship between technologies and skilled labor. 
Beaudry et al. (2013), using data from the Outgoing Rotation Group Current Population Survey 
Supplements for the years 1979-2011, document a decline in the demand for cognitive tasks and 
highly-educated workers from 2000 to 2010. Is this reversion temporary, or does it signify a 
change in the skill-biased nature of technological changes? 
This paper answers the two questions above with a dataset covering the years 1975 to 
2015. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews studies relevant to this 
subject. Section III explains economic of the capital and labor market. Section IV describes 
empirical models estimated in the paper. Section V presents data and summary statistics. Section 
VI summarizes empirical results. Section VII concludes and points out areas for future studies.  
 
II. Literature Review 
II.A Capital-Skill Complementarity 
 The role of skill and education in a production function was tested first by Griliches 
almost 40 years ago (Griliches 1969). Drawing on post-World War II data from U.S. 
manufacturing sectors, Griliches finds a positive relationship between capital employment and 
skill demand. He formalizes this phenomenon as capital-skill complementarity, a hypothesis 
stating that physical capital is more complementary to skilled labor than to unskilled labor. 
Fallon and Layard (1975) confirm this hypothesis with data at both aggregate and sectoral levels.  
However, capital and skilled labor have not always been complements. Studies drawing 
on data from the late 19th century reveal evidence to the opposite. Cain and Paterson (1986) 
examine the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1850 to 1919 and find that physical capital 
complements with raw materials and substitutes for skilled labor. In the same vein, James and 
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Skinner (1985) divide manufacturing sectors in the 1850s into skilled and less skilled sectors. 
They find strong complementary relationship in the skilled sector but relative substitutability in 
the remaining sectors.  
Summing up, while post-World War II data reveals a complementary relationship 
between capital and skill, in the late 19th century capital is found to substitute for skilled labor at 
industry levels. 
 
II.B Skill-Biased Technical Change (SBTC) 
II.B.1 Evidence for the United States 
After capital-skill substitutability in the 19th century and capital-skill complementarity in 
the mid 20th century, the late 20th century is known as a period with growing demand for skilled 
labor (i.e., skill upgrading). Most studies attribute the accelerated skilled upgrading in the late 
20th century to skilled-biased technical change (SBTC). SBTC, also known as the technology-
skill complementarity, is a shift in the production technology that favors skilled over unskilled 
labor by increasing its relative productivity and, therefore, its relative demand (Violante 2008). 
Unlike the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis, the technology-skill hypothesis supports the 
complementarity between new capital (e.g., technology-embodied capital) and skilled labor.  
The paper of Berman et al. (1994) is among the first studies that examines SBTC 
empirically. Relying on data drawn from the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) in the 
1980s, Berman et al. identify an increasing share of skilled labor in total employment within the 
450 industries in U.S. manufacturing. Through an econometric analysis that relates the shift in 
favor of skilled workers to production-labor-saving technical change, they confirm the SBTC 
hypothesis. They attribute the increasing wage share of skilled labor in American manufacturing 
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in the 1980s to the level of investment in R&D and computers. 
Autor et al. (1998) extend Berman et al.’s study by adding more sectors over a longer 
period. They link educational wage-bill share data with computer utilization records from the 
Current Population Survey for years 1960 to 1990. They find a positive relationship between 
growth in computer usage and skill upgrading for 47 U.S. private industry sectors starting in the 
1970s. Although the strong correlation is by no means a causal relationship, their findings are 
valuable in pointing out that the skill upgrading in the U.S. has been concentrated in the most 
computer-intensive sectors.  
 
II.B.2 International Evidence  
Empirical studies outside the United States reveal mixed findings. On the one hand, 
studies of OECD countries strengthen the SBTC hypothesis. Machin and Reenen (1998) study 
the changing wage share and employment in seven OECD countries (United States, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). All countries show a shift in 
relative labor demand in favor of skilled labor and significant complementarity of capital with 
new technology. In the same vein, Michaels et al. (2010) update the model by categorizing labor 
into low, middle, and high educated workers. Using a panel dataset covering the U.S., Japan, and 
nine European countries from 1980-2004, they find strong correlation between the growth in ICT 
and the growth in the demand for the most educated workers. They conclude that technological 
changes since the 1980s can account for up to 25% of the growth in the demand for college-
educated workers. 
On the other hand, countries in the Asia-Pacific region are less influenced by the 
diffusion of skill-biased technologies. Berman et al. (2003) study the manufacturing sector in 
 5 
India during the 1980s. They find that India does not show significant growth in the demand for 
skilled labor that is common to other high-income countries. They also find that increased capital 
investment can explain very little of the increased wage share of skilled labor in Indian 
manufacturing sectors. 
Summing up, countries outside the United States show inconclusive evidence regarding 
SBTC. Despite a rich body of literature on this topic, there remain few studies on the effect of 
ICT and capital on the skill demand in the U.S. after 2000. The next section describes a 
theoretical framework that can be used to test the capital-skill and technology-skill 
complementarity hypotheses in the 21st century. 
 
III. Theory  
 At the industry level, the shift away from unskilled to skilled labor can happen between 
and within industries. In the former case, trade and immigration are likely to cause labor to shift 
away from less-educated and import-competing sectors. In the latter case, skill-biased 
technological changes could reduce the demand for unskilled labor and increase the demand for 
skilled labor within an industry.  
To explore factors that might explain within-industry changes in the skilled labor’s 
employment share, I start from a firm’s cost function. Following the practice of Berman et al. 
(1994) and Autor et al. (1998), I assume heterogeneity of labor by categorizing it into skilled and 
unskilled labor groups. I also assume that the firm’s capital input is quasi-fixed.1 Therefore, the 
firm’s variable cost function is 𝐶𝑉 𝑊$,𝑊&, 𝐾, 𝑄 ,								(1) 
                                                
1 Quasi-fixed capital assumes the capital to be fixed in the short-run. 
 6 
where 𝑊$  and	𝑊&  are the wage rates of skilled and unskilled labor, K stands for quasi-fixed 
capital, and Q represents real output.  
Drawing on Berman et al. (1994), Machin and Van Reenan (1998), and Meschi et al. 
(2008), a translog functional form2 of the variable cost implies  ln 𝐶𝑉 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽445$,& ln 𝑊4 + 𝛽4665$,&45$,& ln 𝑊4 ln 𝑊6 + 𝛽7 ln 𝑌 +𝛽47 ln 𝑌 +45$,& 𝛽9 ln 𝐾 + 𝛽49 ln 𝐾45$,& ,   (2) 
where the 𝛽 parameters denote the effect of factor prices of factor prices, output, and the capital 
stock over total variable cost. Following Shephard’s lemma, the cost-minimizing demand for an 
input can be derived by differentiating the cost function with respect to the factor price. 
Therefore, the share equation for skilled labor can be derived as 𝑆;4 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽<𝑙𝑛	(𝑊$;4/𝑊&;4) + 𝛽@𝑙𝑛	(𝐾;4/𝑄;4	) 	+ 𝛽A𝑙𝑛	𝑄;4 	+ 𝜖;4,								(3) 
where t indexes year, i indexes industry, and 𝜖;4 is the error term.  
In equation (3), the sign of 𝛽< depends on whether the elasticity of substitution between 
skilled and unskilled labor is larger than 1. Estimates of 𝛽@ indicate the relationship between 
capital and skilled labor: capital and skill are complementary inputs if 𝛽@ > 0 and substitutes if 𝛽@ < 0. Estimates of 𝛽A show the relationship between growth in output and the wage share of 
skilled labor.  
To account for the impact of technologies, I augment equation (3) by including a new 
variable 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻;4  to represent technology-embodied capital stock in industry i and year t. The 
new equation becomes 𝑆;4 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽<𝑙𝑛	(𝑊$;4/𝑊&;4) + 𝛽@𝑙𝑛	(𝐾;4/𝑄;4	) + 𝛽A𝑙𝑛	𝑄;4 + 𝛽J𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻;4 + 𝜖;4.								(4) 
                                                
2 A translog functional form provides a second-order approximation to a Cobb-Douglas production function and 
does not impose any restriction on the substitutability of various inputs. 
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where estimates of 𝛽J denote the relationship between technologies and skill demand. The SBTC 
hypothesis suggests the sign of 𝛽J to be positive.  
 
IV. Empirical Models 
 In empirically estimating the skilled labor’s wage share, the wage share variable 𝑊$;4/𝑊&;4 is frequently removed from the model because it is likely to be highly endogenous (Machin 
and Reenen 1998). Assuming (i) complete mobility of employees across industries and (ii) that 
wage differentials are fully absorbed by industry dummy variables, I include fixed effects to 
capture any unobserved heterogeneity between industry that is time-invariant (𝐷4). Equation (4) 
becomes   𝑆;4 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽<𝑙𝑛	(𝐾;4/𝑄;4	) + 𝛽@𝑙𝑛	𝑄;4 + 𝛽A𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻;4 	+ 𝜖;4 + 𝐷4.								(5) 
 Most studies in the early 1990s proxy the stock of technology by the ratio of employees 
using computers at work. Of course, this is hardly a good measure of technologies in the 21st 
century due to the variety of electronic devices employed in the work place. Later studies 
frequently use investment in research and development (R&D) instead. However, R&D is 
recorded separately from software purchases and is not the best variable to measure the 
technology stock either. In this paper, I choose to use the stock of intellectual property products 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) that is comprised of R&D, software, and originals 
work to get a more complete account of firm’s technology stock. Admittedly, this is not the most 
accurate measure of technology because it contains the stock of entertainment, literary, and 
artistic originals at the industry level. However, because R&D and software data is not available 
for industries of interest separately, the stock of intellectual property products is the best 
measurement available to proxy for an industry’s technology stock. I adjust the variable (𝐼𝑃𝑃;4)  
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by output and take the log transformation for a consistent specification on the right-hand side of 
the equation, giving the final equation: 𝑆;4 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽<𝑙𝑛	(𝐾;4/𝑄;4	) + 𝛽@𝑙𝑛	𝑄;4 + 𝛽A𝑙𝑛	(𝐼𝑃𝑃;4/𝑄;4	) + 𝜖;4 + 𝐷4.								(6) 
Table 1 summarizes estimates of 𝛽A  in two relevant studies. Despite the disparity in 
measurements of capital or selections of industries, both papers document positive estimates of 𝛽A  in the U.S. from 1960 to 1980. Both findings indicate the complementary relationship 
between capital and skilled labor and the presence of skill-biased technological change. Using a 
similar framework, this paper reexamines the value of 𝛽A in 18 U.S. industries from 1975 to 
2015. 
Table 1. Estimates of 𝜷𝟑 in Relevant Studies 
 
 
Berman et al., 1994 Autor et al., 1998 
Measurement Capital Stock Five-year sum of real investment  
Industry Manufacturing Manufacturing 41 NIPA Industries 𝛽A in the 1960s 0.140 0.149 0.161 𝛽A in the 1970s 0.129 0.194 0.318 𝛽A in the 1980s 0.389 0.440 0.320 
 
V. Data and Summary Statistics 
The data used in this paper comes from two sources. The first is the Current Population 
Survey March samples from 1975 to 2015. It contains information on annual wage income, 
weeks worked, and usual hours worked per week, as well as demographical information 
regarding age, education level, sex, and race for the nearly 8 million individuals surveyed. 
Following common practice in the field, I limit the dataset to employees within age range 16-64 
and who are working full time throughout the year (i.e., working for more than 35 hours per 
week and more than 40 weeks per year). The second data source is the BEA, which provides 2-
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digit industry level data on (1) real output, (2) stock of private intellectual property products, and 
(3) stock of equipment and structures. 
 
Crosswalk between CPS and BEA 
 In this paper, I consider 18 private sectors that are mapped between the CPS and the 
BEA. The ind1990 variable in the CPS provides a set of industry codes from 1968 forward that 
are consistent with the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) used in the 
BEA datasets. (Refer to the Appendix for the exact crosswalk between two sources.) 
 
Wage Share 
I categorize employees as either skilled or unskilled based on their education background. 
The education background indicates an individual’s level of expertise and is a good proxy for the 
skill level. Those who have obtained a bachelor's or more advanced degree (master's, 
professional school, doctorate degrees, etc.) are categorized as skilled labor.3 The remaining 
employees are classified as unskilled labor, whose education levels range from no degree to high 
school diploma and associate's degree. The wage share variable is then derived as the ratio 
between the sum of the skilled labor’s wage income and total wage income. Table 2 displays the 
skilled labor group's average wage share in 10-year intervals for the industries under analysis. 
The average share grows from 19% in 1975-85 to 39% in 2005-15, an upward trend that is well-
documented.4 Disparities remain in the changes of wage share for different sectors. For sectors 
such as finance and chemical products the wage share ratio is always high (around 40%). Sectors 
                                                
3 Would different definitions of skilled labor change my estimation results? In this paper I follow the practice of 
Berman et al. (1994) and Autor et al. (1998) to group college graduates and beyond as skilled labor. 
4 The upward trend is also documented by Berman et al. (1994) and Goldin and Katz (1996).  
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such as electrical products and paper products experience the largest percentage growth, the ratio 
of which grows from 28% to 62% and from 10% to 45%, respectively. The ratio remains low for 
sectors such as wood and and plastics product across decades. 
Table 2. High Education Wage Share  
 
 1975-1985 1985-1995 1995-2005 2005-2015 
Wholesale trade 0.279 0.328 0.396 0.460 
Retail trade 0.162 0.213 0.260 0.304 
Transportation 0.120 0.172 0.219 0.252 
Finance and insurance 0.404 0.494 0.595 0.686 
Wood 0.107 0.112 0.156 0.196 
Furniture 0.088 0.146 0.167 0.218 
Nonmetallic products 0.147 0.198 0.249 0.266 
Metal 0.159 0.179 0.218 0.243 
Machinery 0.229 0.330 0.397 0.481 
Electrical products 0.276 0.393 0.495 0.618 
Motor vehicles 0.208 0.290 0.352 0.467 
Food, beverage and tobacco 0.142 0.239 0.322 0.377 
Textile mills 0.123 0.178 0.218 0.316 
Apparel and leather products 0.131 0.151 0.270 0.353 
Paper products 0.103 0.215 0.215 0.452 
Printing activities 0.262 0.348 0.430 0.505 
Chemical products 0.367 0.452 0.540 0.573 
Plastics and rubber products 0.166 0.200 0.250 0.286 
Overall 0.193 0.258 0.319 0.392 
 
Explanatory Variables 
To proxy for technological change, I use the stock of intellectual property products from 
the BEA. It is the best measure of technology stock available at the industry level, as explained 
in Section IV. The output-adjusted sum of equipment and structure stocks is used to proxy for 
physical capital. Real output is calculated as nominal output divided by the price level, as 
documented in the BEA dataset. A statistical summary of all variables used in the paper is 
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reported in the Appendix.  
 
VI. Empirical Results 
VI.A Benchmark model 
Table 3 reports a set of fixed-effects regressions covering the four time periods 1975-
1985, 1985-1995, 1995-2005, and 2005-2015. It estimates the change in the skilled labor share of 
wage bill on indicators of changes in physical capital, intellectual property products, and real 
output.  
Model 1 includes only time dummies for time periods 1985-1995, 1995-2005, and 2005-
2015. Coefficients have positive signs, which indicate a continued growth of skilled labor share 
of wage bill through the early 21st century. Model 2 estimates the share equation (6) and shows a 
significant and positive relationship between skill demand and capital stock. According to the 
model estimates, a one percent increase in physical capital will lead to a 0.11% increase in 
skilled labor wage share, and one percent increase in technology-embodied capital will lead to a 
0.02% increase. The positive coefficients support the skill-capital and skill-technology 
complementarity hypotheses. Incidentally, the three independent variables can collectively 
explain more than 60% of the variations in skill demand. Model 3 in enhances equation (6) by 
interacting the intellectual property products stock with time dummy variables. Compared with 
the base period 1975-1985, technological changes appear to be progressively skill biased in the 
1990s and afterwards. The interaction term has a positive sign for all three periods and is largest 
in 2005-2015. This upward trend indicates a stronger relationship between technological changes 
and demand for skilled labor in the 21st century. In model 4, I interact physical capital with time 
dummy variables, and the interaction terms have positive though insignificant coefficient 
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estimates. The evidence suggests capital-skill complementarity across all periods, and no 
significant changes in the complementary relationship in the 21st century. 
 
Table 3. Changes in the Skilled Labor's Wage Share 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 
ln(IPP/Y)  0.0230*** 0.0071 0.0050 
  (0.0056) (0.0052) (0.0056) 
ln(K/Y)  0.1170*** 0.0572*** 0.0697*** 
  (0.0099) (0.0111) (0.0116) 
ln(Y)  -0.0760*** -0.0417*** -0.06130*** 
  (0.0118) (0.0109) (0.0147) 
1985-1995 0.0647***  0.0985*** 0.0300 
 (0.0056)  (0.0283) (0.0212) 
1995-2005 0.1260***  0.2050*** 0.0818*** 
 (0.0056)  (0.0315) (0.0234) 
2005-2015 0.1990***  0.3260*** 0.1310*** 
 (0.0055)  (0.0289) (0.0254) 
1985-1995 
  
0.0116*** 0.00156 
        Interaction 
  
(0.00412) (0.0047) 
1995-2005 
  
0.0244*** 0.0059 
        Interaction 
  
(0.0049) (0.0050) 
2005-2015 
  
0.0393*** 0.0051 
        Interaction 
  
(0.0047) (0.0056) 
Constant 0.1930*** 1.4470*** 0.8120*** 1.0000*** 
 (0.0040) (0.1040) (0.1110) (0.1340) 
     
R squared     
Between 0.67 0.64 0.72 0.69 
Within  0.22 0.38 0.09 
Overall 0.26 0.37 0.48 0.32 
No. of Observations 738 738 738 738 
 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses (z-statistics for random effects model). 
***Significant at 0.01 level. **Significant at 0.05 level. *Significant at 0.1 level. 
 
Summing up, through econometric analysis I find continuously growing demand for 
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skilled labor in the past four decades. The wage share of skilled labor is significantly and 
positively correlated with the stock of physical capital and intellectual property products, 
supporting the capital-skill and technology-skill hypotheses. The complementary relationship 
between technology stocks and capital exhibits an upward trend in the four periods studied.  
 
VI.B Robustness checks 
Table 4 reports tests of robustness to alternative measures of demand for skilled labor. I 
use the employment share of skilled labor to proxy for skill demand, based on the assumption 
that wage differentials across industries can be controlled by the fixed-effects estimator. Model 2 
again returns positive coefficient estimates. Similar to my results from Table 3, models 3 
estimates the interaction terms to be positive, and model 4 estimates them to be positive though 
insignificant. Therefore, the technology-skill complementarity, capital-skill complementarity, 
and a trend towards a stronger complementarity relationship between technologies and skilled 
labor are statistically significant and robust. 
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Table 4. Changes in the Skilled Labor's Employment Share 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 
ln(IPP/Y)  0.00992*** 0.000433 -0.00141 
  (0.00367) (0.00334) (0.00367) 
ln(K/Y)  0.0787*** 0.0464*** 0.0553*** 
  (0.00648) (0.00713) (0.00759) 
ln(Y)  -0.0481*** -0.0246*** -0.0380*** 
  (0.00774) (0.00698) (0.00962) 
1985-1995 0.0419***  0.0668*** 0.0232* 
 (0.00372)  (0.0181) (0.0139) 
1995-2005 0.0722***  0.132*** 0.0401*** 
 (0.00372)  (0.0202) (0.0153) 
2005-2015 0.125***  0.227*** 0.0763*** 
 (0.00363)  (0.0185) (0.0167) 
1985-1995   
0.00863*** 0.00311 
         Interaction   
(0.00269) (0.00308) 
1995-2005   
0.0186*** 0.00498 
        Interaction   
(0.00316) (0.00327) 
2005-2015   
0.0306*** 0.00376 
        Interaction   
(0.00302) (0.00364) 
Constant 0.128*** 0.908*** 0.524*** 0.651*** 
 (0.00263) (0.0682) (0.0713) (0.0879) 
     
R squared     
Between 0.64 0.61 0.72 0.67 
Within  0.21 0.34 0.1 
Overall 0.19 0.32 0.43 0.27 
No. of Observations 738 738 738 738 
 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses (z-statistics for random effects model). 
***Significant at 0.01 level. **Significant at 0.05 level. *Significant at 0.1 level. 
 
 
VI.C Industry-level evidence 
I next examine how the complementary relationships between skill and capital vary 
across industries. I create industry dummy variables for all sectors and interact them with the 
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technology stock and physical capital stock separately. Model 1 in Table 5 presents estimates of 
the coefficient on the stock of intellectual property products. The coefficient estimates are 
highest among electrical products manufacturing, motor vehicles manufacturing and machinery 
manufacturing. These three sectors are also the ones that invest most intensively on 
technologies.5 Model 2 includes interaction terms with physical capital: the coefficient estimates 
are the largest among the same three sectors. On the other hand, retail and transportation 
industries have negative though insignificant coefficient estimates, suggesting capital-skill 
substitutability. This finding indicates that the skill-biased technology changes and capital-skill 
complementarity are most obvious in capital-intensive sectors, whereas sectors that hold low 
stock of physical capital exhibit potential capital-skill substitutability.  
Summing up, disparities remain in the relationships between capital and skill in different 
sectors. On one hand, capital-intensive sectors (e.g., electric products manufacturing) show 
strong evidence in favor of SBTC and capital-skill complementarity.  On the other hand, sectors 
that hold low stock of physical capital (e.g., transportation) exhibit potential capital-skill 
substitutability. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
5 See the Appendix for a plot of the technology intensity across industries. 
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Table 5. Changes in the Skilled Labor's Wage Share, by Industries 
 
Model 1 2 
ln(IPP/Y)  0.0634*** 
  (0.0077) ln(K/Y) 0.0342**  
 (0.0141)  ln(Y) 0.0049 0.0634*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0077) Finance 0.1060*** 0.0787*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0151) Apparel 0.0744*** 0.0238 
 (0.0129) (0.0234)  Chemical Products 0.0642*** 0.0487** 
 (0.0100) (0.0207) Electrical Products 0.3040*** 0.1880*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0167) Food 0.1020*** 0.0871*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0173) Furniture 0.0328** 0.0036 
 (0.0138) (0.0156)  Machinery 0.1260*** 0.0977*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0173)  Metal 0.0397** 0.0264 
 (0.0200) (0.0215) Motor Vehicles 0.1350*** 0.1090*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0144) Nonmetallic Products 0.0631*** 0.0551*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0185) Paper 0.1260*** 0.0957*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0216) Printing 0.0811*** 0.0621*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0196)  Rubber 0.0687*** 0.0445*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0159) Textile Mills 0.0732*** 0.0246 
 (0.0114) (0.0281) Wood 0.0371*** 0.0027 
 (0.0118) (0.0241) Retail 0.0178** -0.0183 
 (0.0077) (0.0200) Transportation 0.0238*** -0.0061 
 (0.0076) (0.0239) Wholesale 0.0391*** 0.0144 
 (0.0084) (0.0236) Constant 1.2010*** 1.2940*** 
 (0.2070) (0.1430) 
   Adjusted R Squared 0.89 0.90 
No. of Observations 738 738 
 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses (z-statistics for random effects model). 
***Significant at 0.01 level. **Significant at 0.05 level. *Significant at 0.1 level. 
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VII. Concluding Remarks 
My results show robust evidence of capital-skill and technology-skill complementarities 
across the 18 sectors analyzed. The complementary relationship is becoming stronger across 
decades and is strongest in the 21st century. Contrary to some claims that suggest the possibility 
of smart machines replacing high-skilled labor, my econometric analysis of the wage share ratio 
over last 40 years indicates a continued trend for technological changes to favor, and 
complement with skilled labor.  
Disparities remain in the magnitude of the capital’s effect on skilled labor’s wage share 
for different industries. When examining the coefficients separately for each sector, all of them 
exhibit technology-skill complementarity and most of them exhibit capital-skill 
complementarity. The complementary relationship is strongest for capital-intensive sectors such 
as electrical products manufacturing, motor vehicles manufacturing, and machinery 
manufacturing. On the other hand, less capital-intensive sectors such as retail and transportation 
suggest capital-skill substitutability. 
However, the positive and significant covariance between capital and technology stock 
wage share is rather mechanical than causal. My finding reveals that whatever factors that cause 
industry-level technology and capital stock to increase in the past 40 years also lead to an 
increase in the skill labor’s wage share. The models are subject to potential endogenous bias as it 
is possible that increased supply, rather than demand, of highly skilled labor motivates 
companies to invest more in technology-embodied capital. For future studies instrumental 
variables uncorrelated with the wage share ratio (such as government spending on R&D) could 
be used to correct the endogeneity bias. 
Another potential area for future studies is to redefine skilled labor not based on 
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education levels but on occupational tasks performed at work.  Autor et al. (2003) introduce a 
new methodology for analyzing changes in the skill demands: instead of using average 
educational levels of workers as a proxy for skill demands, they draw a distinction between skills 
and tasks, and argue that advances in technologies first change the labor division between 
workers and machines, then task composition, and finally the demand for different skills. Using 
data on task requirements from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and the Census and 
Current Population Survey, the authors form a panel dataset of occupational task inputs from 
1960 to 1998. They find a consistent increase in the demand for non-routine cognitive tasks (e.g., 
consulting, marketing, engineering), and non-routine manual tasks (e.g., driving cabs, cleaning 
buildings), and a decrease in routine cognitive and manual tasks (e.g., clerical and bookkeeping 
jobs). They argue that the information and communication technologies function through 
predefined rules and algorithms, and therefore substitute programmable routine tasks and 
complements non-routine tasks that are beyond present programming capacities. Because 
occupational datasets are not available for years after 2005, the framework can not be tested over 
a longer horizon. In the future, it remains of interest to examine the effect of new technologies on 
task composition and skill demand.  
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Appendix 
A. Crosswalk between the CPS and the BEA 
 
 The table below demonstrates how I map industries between the CPS and the BEA 
datasets. The CPS dataset uses a three-digit coding system to store industry information in the 
ind1990 variable. The BEA uses North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and 
aggregates industry information to the two-digit level.  
 
Industry 
 
CPS (ind1990) BEA (Line Number) 
Wholesale trade 500 ~ 571 33 
Retail  
 
580 ~ 691 34 
Transportation  400 ~ 432 35 
Finance 
 
700 ~ 711 49 
Manufacturing 
Durable Wood 230 ~ 241 13 
 
Furniture 242 22 
 
Nonmetallic Products 250 ~ 262 14 
 
Metal  270 ~ 301 15 ~ 16 
 
Machinery  310 ~ 332 17 ~ 18 
 
Electrical Products 340 ~ 350 19 
 
Motor Vehicles 351 ~ 370 20 ~21 
Manufacturing 
Nondurable Food 110 ~ 130 25 
 
Textile Mills 132 ~ 150 26 
 
Apparel  151 ~ 152, 220 ~ 222 27 
 
Paper 160 ~ 162 28 
 
Printing 171 ~ 172 29 
 
Chemical Products 180 ~ 192 31 
 
Rubber  210 ~ 212 32 
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B. Summary Statistics 
 The table below is a statistical summary of the variables employed in the paper. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
year 738 1995 11.84018 1975 2015 
ind_code 738 11.55556 5.286914 3 21 
wage_share 738 0.2929382 0.14608 0.0601058 0.7102382 
employment_share 738 0.1894989 0.1067678 0.016667 0.562397 
ln(IPP/Y) 738 -6.008655 1.338385 -10.80983 -2.590687 
ln(K/Y) 738 -3.601081 1.364823 -7.118826 -0.8078704 
ln(Y) 738 7.816067 1.049408 5.178351 9.897736 
 
C. Technology Intensity 
 
The figure above plots the log of the output adjusted intellectual property product stocks 
for each industry. The most technology-intensive industries are chemical products 
manufacturing, electrical products manufacturing, motor vehicles manufacturing and machinery 
manufacturing. The least intensive ones are wood manufacturing, retail and transportation. 
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D. Capital Intensity 
 
 
The figure above plots the log of the output adjusted physical capital stocks for each 
industry. The most capital-intensive industries are finance, retail and transportation industries. 
The least intensive ones are furniture and apparel sectors. 
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E. Aggregate Wage Share and Employment Share 
 
 The two figures above plot two different measures of the independent variables used in 
the paper: the wage share and the employment share ratio. From 1975 to 2015, skilled labor is 
progressively taking up a larger percent share of total wage bill and employment. 
 
 
